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ABSTRACT 
 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) evidence has been shown to have a 
strong effect on juror decision-making when presented in court.  While 
DNA evidence has been shown to be extremely reliable, fingerprint 
evidence, and the way it is presented in court, has come under much 
scrutiny.  Forensic fingerprint experts have been working on a 
uniformed way to present fingerprint evidence in court.  The most 
promising has been the Probabilistic Based Fingerprint Evidence 
(PBFE) created by Forensic Science Services (FSS) (G. Langenburg, 
personal communication, April 16, 2011).  The current study examined 
how the presence and strength of DNA evidence influenced jurors’ 
interpretation of probabilistic fingerprint evidence.  Mock jurors read a 
summary of a murder case that included fingerprint evidence and 
testimony from a fingerprint expert and, in some conditions, DNA 
evidence and testimony from a DNA expert.  Results showed that when 
DNA evidence was found at the crime scene and matched the 
defendant other evidence and the overall case was rated as stronger 
than when no DNA was present.  Fingerprint evidence did not cause a 
stronger rating of other evidence and the overall case.  Fingerprint 
evidence was underrated in some cases, and jurors generally weighed 
all the different strengths of fingerprint testimony to the same degree.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The right to a fair trial is one of the fundamental rights that the 
United States court system is built upon.  Questions often arise about 
how fair trial proceedings are if the people who are asked to deliver 
verdicts do not correctly understand the information provided to them, 
or, more importantly, misapply the information to produce false 
verdicts.  In recent years, complex scientific data has found its way to 
the forefront of many criminal trials.  The increased use of technology 
and statistics affects the way jurors make decisions.  Jury members 
often believe they understand the scientific information provided to 
them, but do they truly apply this information to their decision making 
correctly?  Is a juror able to render a proper verdict when presented 
with complex scientific information that could be misguided by 
opposing experts?   
Two types of scientific evidence found in many criminal trials 
are DNA and fingerprint evidence.  To date, there is no uniform way 
these types of evidence are presented to jurors.  Forensic experts can 
express the same evidence in different ways, leaving it up to the jury to 
properly decipher the scientific material.  The way in which the 
experts express their scientific findings can have dramatic effects on 
what the jurors conclude from the evidence (Koehler, 2000; Koehler, 
2001; Koehler & Macchi, 2001; Newell, Mitchell, & Hayes, 2008; 
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Schklar & Diamond, 1999; Smith, Penrod, & Park, 1996; Vidmar & 
Diamond, 2001).  DNA analysis and presentation has been subject to 
much skepticism and transformation over the years (Kaye, 1993; 
Koehler, 1993; Lindsey, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2003; Mnookin et al., 
2011; Thompson, 1997).   
While DNA analysis is becoming more uniform in its 
presentation in court, fingerprint analysis and presentation is being 
called into question.  There have been many arguments regarding how 
reliable fingerprint evidence is, along with its presentation in court as 
“matching” or being “consistent with” a known person (McQuiston & 
Saks, 2008).  Many researchers in the fingerprint arena have been 
working on providing a more informative and uniform way to analyze 
and present fingerprint evidence during trials.  The most promising 
presentation to date is the Probabilistic Based Fingerprint Evidence 
(PBFE) method, developed by the Forensic Science Service (FSS) (G. 
Langenburg, personal communication, April 16, 2011).  This method is 
performed with a software program that, with the aid of a fingerprint 
examiner, allows certain configurations of minutiae (matching areas or 
points on a print) between a latent print (crime scene print) and 
reference print to be evaluated, which produces a likelihood ratio.   
The purpose of this thesis research is to understand how jurors 
interpret the newly developed expression of fingerprint print evidence 
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in probabilistic terms when accompanied by DNA evidence.  This 
research also seeks to determine if the presentation of scientific 
evidence in this way affects jurors’ ability to make proper decisions 
about the trial.  It is important to address this concern because if 
jurors do not understand the probabilistic approach to stating 
fingerprint evidence in the accompaniment of DNA, then the approach 
may need to be revised before implemented.  Last, this research will 
provide information about jurors’ general views on complex scientific 
evidence. What are the motives behind their individual 
understanding?  Does their understanding affect how evidence is 
weighed? Are there underlying impressions jurors have that cause 
them to weigh evidence in a certain way? 
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Chapter 2:  Juror Evaluation of Complex Scientific 
Evidence:  Past and Present 
Evaluation of Complex Scientific Evidence - Jurors are often 
regarded as individuals who are intellectually incompetent in 
understanding much, if any, expert evidence (Vidmar & Diamond, 
2001).  There are many common prejudicial misconceptions about 
jurors, such as juries are comprised of uneducated individuals who 
could not find a way to get out of jury duty and jurors uncritically 
accept experts who present complex testimony that they are unable to 
understand (Diamond, 2006).  These conceptions are harsh, but have 
occurred due to the problems jurors have with making systematic 
logical and mathematical errors when evaluating complex scientific 
evidence (Schklar & Diamond, 1999).  Courts have displayed concern 
over these issues, and feel that jurors attach too much weight to 
extremely small probabilities often found in trial settings (Schklar & 
Diamond, 1999).  There is a problem determining fact from fiction with 
juror decision-making because juries in the United States do not have 
to provide an explanation for their verdict and do not reveal any 
information about how they arrived at their decisions during trial 
(Diamond, 2006).  Researchers have been trying to fill this gap and get 
a view of juror deliberations.  Many studies have shown juries to both 
understand and misunderstand complex scientific evidence. 
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 Koehler, Chia, and Lindsay (1995) found that extremely small 
statistical numbers, regardless of their importance in the trial, 
influence juror decisions.  In this study, participants were presented 
with varying estimates of probability that a match was declared 
between crime scene evidence and the defendant, even though the 
defendant was not the true source of the evidence.  Participants were 
presented with an extremely small Random Match Probability (RMP) 
estimate (1 in 1 billion), a large Likelihood (LE) estimate (2 in 100), or 
a combination of both (Koehler, et al, 1995).  In the first study, those 
who received separate RMP and LE estimates found the defendant 
guilty as often as participants who received the combined RMP and LE 
estimate (1 in 1 billion).  In their second study, participants who 
received separate RMP and LE estimates convicted the defendant 
more often than participants who received the combined RMP and LE 
estimate (1 in 1 billion).  Those who received the combined RMP and 
LE estimate of 2 in 100 convicted significantly less than participants 
who received the combined RMP and LE estimate of 1 in 1 billion.  
Jurors were overly influenced by the extremely small estimate. 
 Schklar and Diamond (1999) expanded on the study by 
examining whether participants would view statistics that were 
extremely discriminating but error prone (RMP of 1 in 1 billion, LE of 
2 in 100) differently than a test that is not as discriminating but error 
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free (RMP of 2 in 100, LE of 1 in 1 billion).  Combined, these statistics 
offer the same ratio. Participants who were given small RMP and large 
LE estimates tended to convict the defendant less often than 
participants who were given large RMP and small LE estimates, even 
though they should have both been given the same weight.  Half of the 
participants were provided with an explanation of how to combine 
RMP and LE estimates, but this was not shown to aid juror 
comprehension.   
 Additional studies have shown that jurors have difficulties 
understanding the technicality of the language used by expert 
witnesses.  In ForsterLee, Horowitz, Athaide-Victor, and Brown (2000), 
participants viewed a videotape of a trial involving health problems of 
four plaintiffs potentially caused by the dumping of dangerous 
chemicals into drinking water.  The plaintiffs differed in degrees of 
illness and participants were influenced by the technicality of the 
language used by experts.  The more technical the language, the more 
jurors were not able to differentiate between more or less deserving 
plaintiffs during the compensation part of the trial (ForsterLee, et al, 
2000).   
A similar study was performed by Diamond and Casper (1992).  
Participants watched a videotape of an antitrust trial.  It contained all 
aspects of a regular trial including opening statements, direct and 
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cross examination, closing arguments, and instructions.  Different 
experts used two models.  The first model was a yardstick model where 
damage estimates were based on performance of a similar company 
who was not affected by the price fixing agreement.  The second model 
was a statistical model that used a regression model analyzing past 
performance to project what costs would have been without the price 
fixing agreement.  It was found the statistical evidence was harder to 
understand than the yardstick evidence and that the yardstick 
evidence was viewed as clearer evidence overall.   
 Other studies have found that when presented with complex 
evidence, jurors tend to use other cues to determine verdicts.  
Ratneshwar and Chaiken (1991) provided participants with either a 
highly complex or easily comprehensible situation.  They found that 
participants usually processed the easily comprehensible evidence, but 
not the complex evidence.  When presented with the complex evidence, 
participants tended to rely on the level of expertise of the source of the 
information.  When participants heard information they did not have 
the skill level to understand, it forced them to rely on other aspects of 
the expert testimony.   
To test this theory, Cooper, Bennett, and Sukel (1996) had 
participants watch videotapes of trials that varied in level of expertise 
and scientific evidence (high credentials/high complexity, moderate 
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credentials/high complexity, high credentials/low complexity, moderate 
credentials/low complexity).  The mock civil trial was based on 
exposure to the chemical PCB, which was said to cause the plaintiffs 
illness.  Participants found in favor of the plaintiff when the case was 
presented with high complexity and a highly credentialed expert 
witness (91%) than when the same case was presented with high 
complexity and a moderately credentialed expert witness (64%).  
Similar studies have found the same results.  The expert’s ability to 
convey information, the reputation of the expert, and the credentials of 
the expert are all factors when jurors are faced with highly complex 
evidence (Champagne, Shuman, & Whitaker, 1992; Irkovic & Hans, 
2003; Shuman, Whitaker, & Champagne, 1994).   
 Problems with understanding evidence become more complex 
with the presence of an opposing expert.  Researchers have found that 
jurors become skeptical of all expert testimony when there is an 
opposing expert, instead of being sensitized to the flaws of the other’s 
expert testimony (Levett & Kovera, 2008).  Thompson and Cole (2006) 
discuss the prosecutor’s fallacy and the defense attorney’s fallacy that 
arise when jurors attempt to understand complex scientific evidence on 
both sides of the spectrum.  The prosecutor’s fallacy occurs when a 
juror understands a characteristic being found in 2% of the population 
as meaning there is only a 2% chance that the defendant is not the 
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perpetrator and a 98% chance that the defendant is guilty.  This 
misconception causes a juror to incorrectly favor the prosecution.  The 
defense attorney’s fallacy occurs when a juror understands a 
characteristic being found in 2% of the population as meaning that 2% 
contains thousands of people in a large population and there is no 
relevance in the defendant’s membership to such a large group of 
people.  This misconception causes a juror to incorrectly favor the 
defense.   
Nance and Morris (2002) found an additional fallacy.  They 
found that participants viewed the conditional probability that a 
suspect would match if he were not the source and the probability of 
the suspect’s guilt as equal entities.  When participants were told the 
defendant and the perpetrator matched on a characteristic found in 4% 
of the population, they incorrectly concluded that there was a 4% 
chance that the defendant was the perpetrator.  Additional studies 
have shown similar results.  Wells (1992) presented participants with 
different types of information bearing on the likelihood that a bus 
belonging to a certain company was responsible for killing a dog.  
Participants did not have good reasoning skills with appropriating 
probabilities into verdicts.  Many participants reached an incorrect 
decision by holding the bus company liable instead of determining if 
the company bus killed the dog. 
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Although these studies have found that jurors can have a great 
deal of difficulty understanding probabilistic and statistical evidence, 
there has been little data showing that jurors are overly impressed by 
expert jargon or simply in awe of experts that they are too 
overwhelmed or are uncritical of the testimony at hand (Vidmar & 
Diamond, 2001).  However, these studies all show that there is room 
for improvement in the presentation of complex testimony.   
DNA Match Statistics - DNA analysis is the most trusted form 
of forensic evidence to date (Liberman, Correll, Miether, & Krauss, 
2008; Mnookin et al., 2011; Smith, Penrod, & Park, 1996).  Although 
the methods are clear, there is currently no uniform way to state DNA 
evidence in a courtroom setting.  Testimony with DNA match 
presentations have been transformed from “matching” or being 
“consistent with” a known person to being presented in a statistical 
manner.  Experts present DNA evidence in both frequency (1 in 1,000) 
and probability (0.1%) formats.  The wording and use of both formats 
are left to expert preference. 
DNA match statistics can be presented in many different ways, 
and jurors often weigh evidence based on the Exemplar Cueing Theory 
(Koehler, 2000; Koehler & Macchi, 2004).  This theory is based on the 
assumption that people tend to evaluate the significance of low 
probability events in a way where they are able to imagine examples of 
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the event.  Target and frame effects play an important role in this 
theory (Koehler, 2001; Koehler, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
There are two types of targeting approaches.  Multi-target approach 
takes the “target” of the DNA match away from the main suspect and 
projects it onto a much larger reference population (i.e. 1 in every 
1,000,000 people in the United States would also match).  The single-
target approach keeps the “target” of the DNA match on the main 
suspect (i.e. the chance that the suspect would match by coincidence if 
he were not the source is 1 in 1,000,000) (Koehler, 2001).  There are 
also two types of framing:  frequency and probability.  Frequency is 
framed as 1 in 1,000,000.  The same number in a probability frame is 
0.000001.  These numbers are mathematically the same, but 
psychologically different.  Jurors have been shown to have a flawed 
perception of understanding these chances (Krauss & Sales, 2001; 
Levett, et al, 2005; Newell, Mitchell, & Hayes, 2008; Smith, Bull, & 
Holliday, 2011).   
 Koehler (2000), referencing Exemplar Cueing Theory, 
determined that statistics tend to be more persuasive when framed in 
a probabilistic, single-target format and highlights a particular 
suspect’s chance of matching the evidence.  Probability single-target 
frames do not include a reference or broader class of people to think 
about, which causes jurors to concentrate largely on the suspect at 
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hand.  According to Koehler (2000), match statistics should be stated 
as follows:  “the probability that the suspect would match the blood 
drops if he were not the source is 0.01%” (p. 1278).   
 To test this theory, Koehler (2001) created three experiments.  
In the first, mock jurors were presented with a summary of the 
Clinton-Lewinsky scandal.  The summary stated that a dress worn by 
Ms. Lewinsky did contain “some genetic material (i.e. semen) that 
matched the DNA of President Clinton” and that “a DNA expert 
reports that his tests could not rule out Mr. Clinton as a possible 
source of the recovered genetic material” (p. 498).  Half of the 
participants read “the probability that Mr. Clinton would match the 
semen stain if he were not its source is 0.1%” (single-target, probability 
frame) (p. 499).  The other half of the participants read “1 in 1,000 
people in Washington who are not the source would also match the 
semen stain” (multi-target, frequency frame) (p. 499).  Results showed 
that participants in the single-target probability frame thought it was 
more likely that Clinton was the source of the DNA than participants 
in the multi-target frequency frame.   
 In the next experiment, Koehler (2001) took the target and 
frame effects a step further.  Some mock jurors in this experiment were 
provided with both a single-target probability frame and multi-target 
frequency frame.  Mock jurors were provided with a case summary of a 
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murder trial in Houston.  The DNA match statistic was fixed at 0.001 
or 1 in 1,000.  The five conditions were as follows:  single-target, 
probability frame; single-target frequency frame; multi-target 
probability frame; multi-target frequency frame; dual presentation 
(single-target probability frame and multi-target frequency frame).  
Participants in the single-target probability condition gave the highest 
estimates for source and guilt, while participants in the multi-target 
frequency frame gave the lowest.  The dual presentation participants 
gave estimates that were in between both of the above conditions.  
Results showed that providing jurors with dual perspectives seems to 
eliminate the most juror error.   
 In the third and final experiment, Koehler tested target and 
frame effects for extremely small incident rates.  Rates of 1 in 1,000, 1 
in 1,000,000, and 1 in 1,000,000,000 were used using the same 
Houston crime scene information from the second experiment (in 
probabilistic terms:  0.1, 0.0001, and 0.0000001, respectively).  It was 
found that target and frame effects became smaller as the incident 
rates became smaller.  Participants were not able to distinguish 
between 1 in 1,000,000 and 1 in 1,000,000,000.  This is a possible 
ceiling effect on the value of statistical DNA evidence.   
In a follow-up experiment, Koehler and Macchi (2004) examined 
ratio bias.  This is the idea that large ratios (i.e. 10/100) are more 
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difficult to comprehend than smaller ratios (i.e. 1/10). Incident rates 
that contained numerators greater than or equal to 1 provided 
exemplars and appeared to make the evidence seem progressively 
weaker.  The authors suggested it could possibly be useful to provide 
statistical evidence to jurors in multiple ways to minimize types of 
bias, which has been the method adopted by many DNA experts during 
testimony. 
Fingerprint Analysis Speculation - Fingerprint analysis has 
recently undergone the scrutiny that DNA evidence experienced years 
ago.  The major landmark case that brought this evidence into 
question was the Brandon Mayfield case (Cole, 2005; Spinney, 2010).  
On March 11, 2004, terrorist explosions occurred through Madrid, 
Spain’s commuter trains, killing 119 people and wounding 2,000.  
Spanish investigators were able to locate an abandoned set of 
detonator caps inside a plastic bag near one of the crime scenes.  
Investigators were able to lift a single, incomplete fingerprint off of the 
plastic bag.  Spain encouraged the help of international agents, and on 
May 6, 2004, the FBI arrested Oregon lawyer Brandon Mayfield, 
stating his print was a “match” to the one found on the plastic bag.  
Approximately two weeks later, the FBI was forced to release Mayfield 
after the Spanish police arrested an Algerian national whose print was 
a stronger match.  The FBI admitted they had made multiple errors in 
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the fingerprint analysis.  This case caused fingerprint analysis and its 
reliability to be called in question.   
 Another blow to the reliability of fingerprint evidence occurred a 
few years after the Mayfield case.  In February of 2009, the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) released a report on the forensic sciences 
that concluded:  “With the exception of DNA analysis,…no forensic 
method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, 
and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between 
evidence and a specific individual or source” (Mnookin, et al, 2011, p. 
729).  These two landmark events provided the backbone for the start 
of vigorous research in the area of fingerprint analysis.   
 The majority of the research concentrated on the ACE-V method 
(Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, Verification) used by all 
fingerprint examiners to examine fingerprint evidence.  Researchers 
suggest strict guidelines be enforced when using the ACE-V method 
(Cole, 2008; Haber & Haber, 2007; Koehler, 2008a; Sweinton, 2004).  
Currently, ACE-V is conducted in a way that is individualized by 
different laboratories.  A detailed ACE-V manual and report form 
should be created so there is uniformity among laboratories.  Along 
with this, there should be standard training programs and proficiency 
measures to avoid the possibility of making erroneous 
individualizations.  ACE-V has yet to be systematically tested for 
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validity.  Examiners in the same laboratory that have some knowledge 
of the case at hand often perform the verification stage of ACE-V, 
which creates a bias (Koehler, 2008b; Langenburg, Champod, & 
Wertheim, 2009).  This calls for a double-blind method of examination.  
Neither the administrator nor the examiner verifying should know 
details of the case in question.  This double blind method would also be 
useful for proficiency tests for fingerprint examiners.   
 The Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) has 
also been called into question.  The computer program provides a 
search of fingerprints among a database of millions of ten-print cards 
and provides a ranked list of top candidates based on similarities.  
Often, the technology is not useful on its own.  Due to quality problems 
in a lot of latent prints, the program alone would provide erroneous 
results.  A common method of analysis is for the fingerprint examiner 
to manually mark minutiae before beginning the search in AFIS, 
which has been shown to increase accuracy in the program (Jain & 
Feng, 2011; Puertas, et al, 2010).  Many critics are still skeptical of 
how useful and objective AFIS is due to the necessary human step 
(Busey & Prada, 2010).   
 Overall, there has been a strong call for some type of error rate 
attached to fingerprint results.  Researchers desire a type of threshold 
to help examiners explain the significance of their observations 
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(Collins, 2009).  The Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge 
Analysis (SWGFAST) has responded to these demands by proposing 
certain measures for rates of errors, suggesting technical reviews of 
fingerprint examinations, and providing a standardized sufficiency 
graph (SWGFAST, 2011).  The group does stay on the side of caution 
with a minutiae threshold, though, because there are many different 
numbers of minutiae that can provide a significant result.  
Fingerprint Match Statistics - Forensic examiners, including 
fingerprint examiners, are presently unable to produce RMPs due to 
there being no cataloged fingerprint examination history to attribute 
possible error rates.  If two markings (one being the latent print from 
the crime scene, one being the ten print provided by the suspect) are 
undistinguishable, they are said to “share a common origin” “to the 
exclusion of all others in the world” and that they have “identified the 
source” (McQuiston & Saks, 2008, pp. 1159-1160).  The conclusion of 
this type of “match” is impossible.  This information is solely based on 
the fingerprint examiner’s opinion that individualization has been met 
(Thompson & Cole, 2006).  Fingerprint experts manually match certain 
markings between the latent and suspect prints and provide their own 
opinions.  These conclusions can differ between different experts.  This 
subjective way of displaying evidence has been shown to provide high 
estimates of source probability (McQuiston & Saks, 2008).  These 
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opinions tend to increase jurors’ confidence in their understanding of 
the evidence.  Because of this, there has been a strong demand for 
fingerprint expert testimony to be provided in a more probabilistic 
manner.   
 Bayesian model represents the application of probability theory 
(Evett et al., 2000).  The model reveals the importance of the likelihood 
ratio, which concentrates on three key principles for the proper 
interpretation of forensic evidence:   
(1) Interpretation of scientific evidence is carried out within a 
framework of circumstances.  The interpretation depends on the 
structure and content of the framework.  (2) Interpretation is 
only meaningful when two or more competing propositions are 
addressed.  (3) The role of the forensic scientist is to consider the 
probability of the evidence given the propositions that are 
addressed. (Evett et al., p. 235) 
 
The Forensic Science Service (FSS) has developed a verbal convention 
for likelihood ratios: 
 
 >106   Extremely Strong 
 105 to 106 Very Strong 
 103 to 105 Strong 
 102 to 103 Moderate 
 >1 to 102 Limited 
 1  Inconclusive 
 0  Exclusion 
 
The way these ratios would be stated in court is:  “It is 10,000 times 
more likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if the suspect is 
the source of the fingerprint found at the crime scene than if some 
other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the source of the 
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fingerprint” (G. Langenburg, personal communication, April 16, 2011).  
Over the past few years, researchers at FSS have developed a 
statistical software program that allows certain configurations of 
minutiae (points) in a latent print and reference print to be evaluated, 
which produces the outcome of a likelihood ratio (Forensic Science 
Service (FSS), 2010).  This ratio frames the expert testimony based on 
the likelihood the defendant’s print would match.  The larger the ratio, 
the more likely the latent print belongs to the defendant.  The software 
is currently in the final stages of development and a workshop has 
been developed called Probability Software and Fingerprint 
Comparison Technology Transition Workshop.  It is currently being 
taught to fingerprint examiners all over the United States, with 
sponsorship being provided by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 
and the National Forensic Science Technology Center (NFSTC).  There 
are three main objectives to the workshop.  The first is to provide a 
support system for the fingerprint examination process by introducing 
a degree of objective evaluation.  This step would be in addition to 
individual expert interpretation and would add a technological 
comparison that could either back the original opinion or aid with 
reevaluating the evidence.  The second is to determine if a probabilistic 
approach could enhance the impact of fingerprint evidence by allowing 
latent prints that have been deemed to be of “no value” to be examined.  
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It is possible that the computer programs could pick up additional 
information that the human eye misses.  The third is to investigate if 
using a common framework, for example, DNA and fingerprints, could 
combine evidence from different areas of expertise.  Uniformity in 
these areas could aid with juror interpretation.  The goal of the FSS 
software is to provide an “objective” quantification of probability to 
enhance the fingerprint examiner’s conclusion.   
 This software will provide the likelihood ratio by calculating a 
within-finger variability and between-finger variability.  These values 
will provide a fraction (numerator and denominator, respectively), and 
will use a database of several thousand minutiae configurations.  The 
software requires the examiner to input the corresponding minutiae 
from the latent print and suggested match print.  It does not locate the 
match, so AFIS still serves an important function during analysis.  The 
software is also extremely user-friendly.  It can run on most existing 
operating computer systems and can be well integrated in the current 
fingerprint examination process.  This software has been the most 
prominent step forward in the area of fingerprint analysis. 
The Present Study - This literature outlines major concerns with 
juror understanding of complex scientific evidence.  It is important to 
know whether or not jurors are able to comprehend complex evidence, 
even if it is somewhat overwhelming to understand.  The problems 
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with probabilistic statistics are evident, but it is important to 
comprehend how jurors make decisions based on this type of evidence.  
The purpose of this study is to measure how jurors understand 
probabilistic fingerprint evidence in general, and more importantly, 
how they understand it in the presence of other types of evidence (in 
this case, DNA evidence).   
More specifically, this study examines how the presence or 
absence of DNA evidence will affect the perceived weight mock jurors 
attach to fingerprint evidence.  Prior studies have performed this type 
of analysis with different types of evidence independent from one 
another.  A major goal of this research is to grasp how mock jurors will 
understand a multitude of evidence presented together, as this is likely 
seen in many criminal trials.  Also, by taking away external expert 
cues that have been displayed in previous studies (credentials, 
education, verbal cues), it can be determined how jurors regard the 
evidence itself.   
It is hypothesized that probabilistic fingerprint evidence will be 
weighed more heavily in the presence of DNA evidence regardless of 
whether the DNA evidence is strong or weak because it is currently the 
most highly regarded scientific evidence.  It is also predicted that 
jurors will rate probabilistic fingerprint evidence more conservatively 
than they rate “match” fingerprint evidence.  However, it is still 
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expected that the probabilistic fingerprint evidence will be 
overweighed at all levels.  Jurors will likely perceive all the varying 
degrees of fingerprint evidence to be a strong determining factor, 
which will cause them to deduce that the case, including all the other 
evidence, must also be strong.   
This research will also explore whether factors such as 
educational background and science and math backgrounds affect how 
jurors interpret probabilistic fingerprint and DNA evidence.  By 
recognizing what influences juror decisions with these types of 
evidence, what goes on during jury deliberation will be distinguishable.  
It is important to interpret whether or not jurors grasp probabilistic 
fingerprint evidence to determine if it should be implemented in real 
court settings.  If jurors are unable to properly evaluate the fingerprint 
evidence, improvements should be made on the probabilistic approach 
before implementation.   
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
 Participants - Four hundred eighty-five undergraduate students 
from Arizona State University (ASU) participated in exchange for 
course credit.  
Design – The research design was a 3 (DNA 
presentation/strength:  0.0001% or 1 in 1,000,000 match, 0.1% or 1 in 
100 match, no DNA) x 4 (Fingerprint presentation/probability 
likelihood ratio strength:  10 million likelihood, 10 thousand likelihood, 
100 likelihood, match) fully randomized between-groups design.   
The case participants read consisted of a one-page summary of a 
murder trial in which DNA and fingerprint evidence, except for the no 
DNA condition, recovered from the crime scene matched the defendant 
(see Appendix A for complete summaries).  The case involved a robbery 
and murder of a convenience store clerk.  A hair was found inside the 
mask with a pulp in which DNA could be extracted.  The surveillance 
camera was not working at the time of the robbery, and an eyewitness 
was unable to identify the perpetrator due to a mask being worn.  The 
analyses of the fingerprint evidence, and in most cases the DNA 
evidence, linked suspect Aaron Robinson to the crime.   
Independent Variables – The first variable was DNA 
presentation/strength.  Participants either read that:  A) no DNA was 
able to be extracted from the crime scene sample; B) DNA was found at 
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the crime scene, matched the defendant, and “The probability that the 
suspect would match the DNA found in the hair if he were not the 
source is 0.1% or 1 in 1,000”; or C) DNA was found at the crime scene, 
matched the defendant, and “The probability that the suspect would 
match the DNA found in the hair if he were not the source is 0.0001% 
or 1 in 1,000,000”.   
For the second variable, fingerprint presentation/probability 
likelihood ratio strength was manipulated.  Participants read that:  A) 
A latent print was lifted from the scene, was matched to the defendant, 
and was presented as:  “The latent print found at the crime scene is a 
match to Mr. Robinson’s print”; B) A latent print was lifted from the 
scene, was matched to the defendant, and was presented as:  “It is 100 
times more likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if the Mr. 
Robinson is the source of the fingerprint found at the crime scene than 
if some other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the source of the 
fingerprint”; C) A latent print was lifted from the scene, was matched 
to the defendant, and was presented as:  “It is 10,000 times more likely 
to observe this configuration of minutiae if the Mr. Robinson is the 
source of the fingerprint found at the crime scene than if some other, 
randomly selected, unrelated person is the source of the fingerprint”; 
or D) A latent print was lifted from the scene, was matched to the 
defendant, and was presented as:  “It is 10 million times more likely to 
	  	   25	  
observe this configuration of minutiae if the Mr. Robinson is the source 
of the fingerprint found at the crime scene than if some other, 
randomly selected, unrelated person is the source of the fingerprint”. 
 Dependent Variables - Mock jurors estimated the strength of the 
case against the defendant, the strength of the DNA evidence (if 
applicable) and the strength of the fingerprint evidence.  The mock 
jurors also answered general questions about the accuracy and 
reliability of both DNA and fingerprint evidence.  Other questions were 
answered about general understanding of probabilities, math and 
science knowledge, and other related general material that could be 
applied to the mock juror’s understanding of forensic evidence.  Jurors 
also provided verdicts and sentencing, along with their own definitions 
of how DNA and fingerprint evidence is analyzed (See Appendix B for 
complete questionnaire). 
 Procedure - The study was performed completely online using 
the online survey program Survey Monkey.  Mock jurors first read the 
consent letter, then a case summary, which the survey program 
selected at random. Mock jurors then answered the series of questions 
summarized above, along with general demographic information.  The 
participants were debriefed when they finished the questionnaire.   
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Chapter 4 – Data Analyses and Results 
 Participants were 74% female with a mean age of 24.04 (SD = 
6.596).  The participants were 58.8% Caucasian, 20.0% 
Hispanic/Latino, 4.7% Asian, and 3.3% African American, while 13.2% 
left the answer blank or chose another ethnicity.  Participant 
education levels were: 7.6% Freshman, 11.1% Sophomore, 30.3% 
Junior, 50.7% Senior, with 0.2% Unidentified.  Participant ethnicities 
and education levels were representative of ASU’s student population. 
Case Specific Dependent Measures 
A 2-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
performed to test the effect of DNA evidence and fingerprint evidence 
on ten primary dependent measures:  strength of case (How strong do 
you think the case is against the defendant?), likelihood of defendant 
being guilty (Based on the information you read, what is the likelihood 
the defendant is guilty of murdering the convenience store clerk?), 
certainty the correct suspect was apprehended (How certain are you 
that the police apprehended the correct suspect in this case?), verdict 
confidence (How much confidence do you have in the verdict you 
chose?), verdict choice (Do you think the defendant is guilty or not 
guilty of committing murder?), likelihood of the head hair belonging to 
the defendant (What do you think is the likelihood that the head hairs 
found in the mask at the crime scene belong to the defendant?), 
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strength of DNA evidence (How strong do you think the DNA evidence 
is against the defendant?), likelihood of the fingerprint in the mask 
belonging to the defendant (What do you think is the likelihood that 
the fingerprint found in the mask at the crime scene was left by the 
defendant?), accuracy of eyewitness account (How accurate do you 
think was the eyewitness’s account of the crime?), and accuracy of 
surveillance video (How reliable do you think the surveillance video is 
in identifying the defendant?).  The omnibus test of the main effect of 
DNA evidence was statistically significant, F (17, 904) = 8.12, p < .001; 
Wilk’s λ = 0.741, ηp2 = .14.  The omnibus test of the main effect of 
fingerprint evidence was not statistically significant, F (26, 1320) = 
1.14, p = .283; Wilk’s λ = 0.935, ηp2 = .02.  The interaction between 
DNA evidence and fingerprint evidence was also not significant, F (53, 
2309) = 1.14, p = .235; Wilk’s λ = 0.875, partial ηp2 = .02.   
Given these results, univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) 
were run to test the impact of the DNA evidence on the ten primary 
dependent measures.  The results for these ten questions were grouped 
by strength of the case overall, strength of fingerprint evidence, 
strength of DNA evidence, and strength of other evidence.   
 Strength of Overall Case – An ANOVA examined the influence 
of fingerprint evidence and DNA match on the strength of the case 
overall (How strong do you think the case is against the defendant?), 
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based on a ten-point scale from low to high strength.  There was a 
significant main effect of the strength of DNA match on the strength of 
the overall case, F (2, 460) = 17.31, p < .001; ηp2 = .07.  Tukey’s HSD 
test showed when participants were presented with the higher 
strength DNA match (0.0001% or 1/1,000,000) they perceived the 
overall case as being stronger (M = 6.11, SD = 2.31) than when 
presented with the lower strength DNA evidence (0.1% or 1/1,000) (M 
= 5.75, SD = 2.13), p = .04.  When presented with lower strength DNA 
evidence, they perceived the overall case as being stronger then when 
presented with no DNA match (M = 4.69, SD = 2.14), p < .001. (See 
Figure 1) 
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Figure 1.  Overall case strength 
 
 
Figure 1.  Graph 1 displays the relationship between overall case 
strength and different strengths of both DNA and fingerprint evidence.  
The interaction between the two types of evidence is not significant.  
When no DNA was present, varying strengths of fingerprint evidence 
were not significantly different from each other.  The higher strength 
fingerprint evidence was underweighted.  Graph 2 isolates the varying 
strengths of DNA matches.  The strength of the case significantly 
increased as DNA match levels increased. 
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Next, participants were asked about the likelihood of the 
defendant being guilty (Based on the information you read, what is the 
likelihood the defendant is guilty of murdering the convenience store 
clerk?), based on a ten-point scale from low to strong likelihood.  There 
was a significant main effect of the strength of the DNA match on the 
likelihood of the defendant being guilty, F (2, 460) = 23.22, p < .001; ηp2 
= .09.  When participants were presented with the higher DNA match, 
they perceived a stronger likelihood of the defendant being guilty (M = 
6.65, SD = 2.21) than when presented with the lower DNA match (M = 
6.02, SD = 2.07), p = .024.  When presented with the lower DNA match, 
they perceived a stronger likelihood of the defendant being guilty than 
when presented with no DNA match (M = 5.01, SD = 2.10), p < .001.  
Then, participants were asked about the certainty the correct 
suspect was apprehended (How certain are you that the police have 
apprehended the correct suspect in this case?), based on a ten-point 
scale from low to strong certainty.  There was a significant main effect 
of the strength of DNA match on the level of certainty the correct 
suspect was apprehended, F (2, 460) = 22.24, p < .001; ηp2 = .09.  When 
participants were presented with the higher DNA match, they were 
more certain the correct suspect was apprehended (M = 7.08, SD = 
2.41) than when presented with the lower DNA match (M = 5.55, SD = 
2.39), p = .037.  When presented with the lower DNA match, they were 
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more certain the correct suspect was apprehended than when 
presented with no DNA match (M = 4.41, SD = 2.42), p = .037, p < .001.  
 Next, participants were asked about verdict confidence (How 
much confidence do you have in the verdict you chose?), based on a ten-
point scale from low to strong confidence.  There was a significant 
main effect of the strength of DNA match on verdict confidence, F (2, 
460) = 11.80, p < .001; ηp2 = .05.  When participants were presented 
with the higher DNA match, they had greater confidence in their 
verdict (M = 6.86, SD = 2.07) than when presented with the lower DNA 
match (M = 6.17, SD = 2.16), p = .010.  When presented with the lower 
DNA match, they had greater confidence in their verdict than when 
presented with no DNA match (M = 5.74, SD = 2.09), p = .010, p < .001.   
 Participants were also asked to choose a verdict (Do you think 
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of committing murder?).  A chi-
square analysis showed DNA match strength and fingerprint strength 
conditions had a significant effect on verdict choice, χ2 (11) = 43.23, p < 
.001.  When participants were presented with a fingerprint match 
(“The latent print found at the crime scene is a match to Mr. 
Robinson’s print.”), 76.1% thought the defendant was guilty when also 
presented with the higher DNA match, 69.7% found the defendant 
guilty when presented with the lower DNA match, and 47.6% found 
the defendant guilty when presented with no DNA.  Guilt verdicts 
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were roughly similar for the three DNA conditions when also presented 
with the lowest strength fingerprint evidence (“It is 100 times more 
likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if the Mr. Robinson is 
the source of the fingerprint found at the crime scene than if some 
other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the source of the 
fingerprint.”).  When presented with the moderate strength fingerprint 
evidence (“It is 10,000 times more likely to observe this configuration 
of minutiae if the Mr. Robinson is the source of the fingerprint found at 
the crime scene than if some other, randomly selected, unrelated 
person is the source of the fingerprint.”), participant guilty verdicts did 
not strongly differ between the lower DNA match and the no DNA 
match, but participants convicted at the highest rate when coupled 
with the higher DNA match.  When presented with the highest 
strength fingerprint evidence (“It is 10 million times more likely to 
observe this configuration of minutiae if the Mr. Robinson is the source 
of the fingerprint found at the crime scene than if some other, 
randomly selected, unrelated person is the source of the fingerprint.”), 
participant verdicts did not strongly differ between any of the DNA 
conditions.  Participants were sensitive to the differing fingerprint 
strengths when no DNA match was present when rendering a verdict 
(31.9% fingerprint 100, 56.8% fingerprint 10,000, and 62.8% 
fingerprint 10,000,000 respectively).  (See Figure 2).  
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Figure 2.  Guilty Verdicts 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The graph displays the percentage of guilty verdicts for each 
condition.  The higher strength DNA match rendered more guilty 
verdicts, excluding when coupled with the higher strength fingerprint 
evidence.  When no DNA was present, participants rendered more 
guilty verdicts when the fingerprint evidence strength increased.   
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head hair belonged to the defendant (M = 7.24, SD = 2.6) than when 
presented with the lower DNA match (M = 6.61, SD = 2.32), p = .057.  
When presented with the lower DNA match, they believed there was a 
stronger likelihood that the head hair belonged to the defendant than 
when presented with no DNA match (M = 5.09, SD = 2.31), p = .057, p 
< .001.  (See Figure 3).   
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Figure 3.  Head Hair Likelihood 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Graph 1 displays the likelihood the head hairs belong to the 
defendant within each condition.  The higher DNA match rendered the 
highest likelihoods within all the varying strengths of fingerprint 
evidence.  When no DNA was present, there were no significant 
likelihood differences between any strengths of fingerprint evidence.  
The higher strength fingerprint evidence was underweighted.  Graph 2 
isolates the varying strengths of DNA matches.  The likelihood 
significantly increased as the strength of DNA match increased. 
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DNA evidence is against the defendant?), based on a ten-point scale 
from low to high strength.  There was a significant main effect of the 
strength of DNA match on the rating of its strength, F (2, 460) = 53.15, 
p < .001; ηp2 = .19.    When participants were presented with the higher 
DNA match, they rated the strength of the DNA evidence higher (M = 
7.08, SD = 2.75) than when presented with the lower DNA match (M = 
6.41, SD = 2.61), p = .060.  When presented with the lower DNA match, 
they rated the strength of the DNA evidence higher than when 
presented with no DNA match (M = 4.06, SD = 2.74), p < .001. 
 Strength of Fingerprint Evidence – An ANOVA examined the 
influence of DNA evidence on the likelihood of the fingerprint from the 
crime scene belonging to the defendant (What do you think is the 
likelihood that the fingerprint found in the mask at the crime scene 
was left by the defendant?), based on a ten-point scale from low to high 
likelihood.  There was a significant main effect of the strength of DNA 
match on the fingerprint likelihood, F (2, 460) = 5.80, p = .003; ηp2 = 
.03.  Tukey’s HSD test showed when participants were presented with 
the higher DNA match, they found there was a stronger likelihood that 
the fingerprint belonged to the defendant (M = 6.86, SD = 2.44) than 
when presented with the lower DNA match (M = 6.45, SD = 2.36), p = 
.060.  When presented with the lower DNA match, they found there 
was a stronger likelihood that the fingerprint belonged to the 
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defendant than when presented with no DNA match (M = 5.89, SD = 
2.44), p < .001.  (See Figure 4).   
Figure 4.  Fingerprint Likelihood 
 
 
Figure 4.  Graph 1 displays the likelihood the fingerprint belonged to 
the defendant within each condition.  The higher DNA match rendered 
the highest likelihoods within all the varying strengths of fingerprint 
evidence.  When no DNA was present, there were no significant 
likelihood differences between any strengths of fingerprint evidence.  
Graph 2 isolates the varying strengths of DNA matches.  The 
likelihood significantly increased as the strength of DNA match 
increased. 
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Strength of Other Evidence – The influence of DNA evidence on 
the accuracy of the eyewitness account was also examined (How 
accurate do you think was the eyewitness’s account of the crime?), 
based on a ten-point scale from low to high accuracy.  There was not a 
significant main effect of the strength of DNA match on the accuracy of 
the eyewitness account, F (2, 460) = 0.42, p = .659; ηp2 = .002.  
 The participants were also asked about the accuracy of the 
surveillance video in identifying the defendant (How reliable do you 
think the surveillance video is in identifying the defendant?), based on 
a ten-point scale from low to high reliability.  There was a significant 
main effect of the strength of the DNA match on the accuracy of the 
surveillance video, F (2, 460) = 3.46, p = .032; ηp2 = .02.  Tukey’s HSD 
test showed when participants were presented with the higher DNA 
match, they found the surveillance video to be less accurate (M = 3.52, 
SD = 2.91) than when presented with no DNA evidence (M = 4.39, SD 
= 3.13), p = .027.  
General Accuracy Dependent Measures 
 A 2-way MANOVA was performed to test the effect DNA 
evidence and fingerprint evidence on general accuracy dependent 
measures:  general accuracy of fingerprint examinations (In general, 
how accurate do you think are the results of fingerprint comparisons?), 
general accuracy of DNA examinations (In general, how accurate do 
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you think are the results of DNA analyses?), how accurately DNA is 
presented during trial (How accurately do you feel DNA evidence is 
presented in trials?), and general reservations about science (Do you 
have general reservations about science?).  The omnibus test of the 
main effect of DNA evidence was statistically significant, F (8, 888) = 
3.90, p < .001; Wilks’ λ = 0.93, ηp2 = .34.  The omnibus test of the main 
effect of fingerprint evidence was not statistically significant, F (12, 
1175) = 1.90, p = .07; Wilks’ λ = 0.93, ηp2 = .03.  The interaction 
between DNA and fingerprint evidence was also not statistically 
significant, F (24, 1550) = 1.00, p = .46; Wilks’ λ = 0.95, ηp2 = .01.  
Given these results, ANOVAs were run to test the impact of DNA 
evidence on these general accuracy measures. 
When examining the effect of fingerprint and DNA evidence on 
participant assessment of general accuracy of fingerprint examinations 
(In general, how accurate do you think are the results of fingerprint 
comparisons?), based on a ten-point scale from low to high accuracy, 
there was a significant main effect on strength of DNA evidence, F (2, 
460) = 4.57, p = .011; ηp2 = .02.  When participants were presented with 
the higher DNA match, they found general fingerprint examinations to 
be more accurate (M = 6.79, SD = 2.12) than when presented with 
lower DNA match (M = 6.60, SD = 2.12), p = .057.  When presented 
with the lower DNA match, they found general fingerprint 
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examinations to be more accurate than when presented with no DNA 
match (M = 6.03, SD = 2.20), p < .001.  
 Participants were asked to assess the general accuracy of DNA 
examinations (In general, how accurate do you think are the results of 
DNA analyses?), based on a ten-point scale from low to high accuracy.  
There was a significant main effect on strength of DNA match, F (2, 
460) = 8.84, p < .001; ηp2 = .04.  When participants were presented with 
the higher DNA match, they found general DNA examinations to be 
more accurate (M = 8.23, SD = 1.92) than when presented with the 
lower DNA match (M = 7.86, SD = 2.16), p = .032.  When presented 
with the lower DNA match, they found general DNA examinations to 
be more accurate than when presented with no DNA match (M = 7.24, 
SD = 2.30), p < .001. 
Participants were also questioned about how accurately DNA is 
presented during trial (How accurately do you feel DNA evidence is 
presented in trials?), based on a ten-point scale from low to high 
accuracy.  There was a significant main effect on strength of DNA 
match, F (2, 473) = 7.82, p < .001; ηp2 = .03.  When participants were 
presented with the higher DNA match, they found DNA to be more 
accurately presented during trial (M = 7.61, SD = 1.95) than when 
presented with the lower DNA match (M = 6.95, SD = 2.19), p = .045.  
When presented with the lower DNA match, they found DNA to be 
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more accurately presented during trial than when presented with no 
DNA match (M = 6.64, SD = 2.54), p = .045, p < .001.  
 Participants were also asked about general reservations about 
science (Do you have general reservations about science?), based on a 
ten-point scale from few to many reservations.  There was a significant 
main effect on strength of DNA evidence, F (2, 460) = 8.84, p = .005; ηp2 
= .01.  When participants were presented with the higher DNA match, 
they had fewer reservations about science (M = 3.10, SD = 2.18) than 
when presented with the lower DNA match (M = 3.26, SD = 1.96), p = 
.042.  When presented with the lower DNA match, they had fewer 
reservations about science than when presented with no DNA match 
(M = 3.84, SD = 2.09), p < .005.  
Correlations 
 
Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to assess the 
relationship between age and general reservations about science (Do 
you have general reservations about science?).  There was a negative 
correlation between the two variables, r = -.06, N = 484, p < .001.  As 
age increased, reservations about science decreased.  The relationship 
between college level and general reservations about science was also 
assessed.  There was a negative correlation between the two variables, 
r = -0.11, N = 485, p = .013.  As college level increased, general 
reservations about science decreased. 
	  	   42	  
The relationship between hours of general crime-themed shows 
watched (How many hours do you spend per week watching general 
crime-themed programs (i.e. Law and Order SVU, Law and Order LA, 
NCIS)?) and self-reported understanding of forensic processes (How 
strongly do you understand the processes that forensic scientists use to 
analyze different types of evidence?) was computed.  There was a 
positive correlation between the hours of general crime-themed shows 
watched and the self-reported understanding of forensic processes, r = 
0.19, N = 484, p < .001.  As hours of crime-themed shows watched 
increased, participant understanding of forensic processes increased.  
There was also a positive correlation between the hours of crime-
themed shows watched and the self-reported understanding of DNA 
evidence (How well do you feel you understand the process of analyzing 
and comparing DNA evidence?), r = 0.15, N = 484, p = .001.  As hours 
of crime-themed shows watched increased, participant understanding 
of DNA evidence increased.  Also, there was a positive correlation 
between the hours of crime-themed shows watched and the 
understanding of fingerprint evidence (How well do you feel you 
understand the process of analyzing and comparing fingerprint 
evidence?), r = 0.16, N = 485, p < .001.  As hours of crime-themed 
shows watched increased, participant understanding of fingerprint 
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evidence increased.  Similar relationships were found with forensic 
themed shows. 
Also, participants were asked to provide probability percentages 
for events that occur 1 out of 1,000 times (If there is a 1 out of 1,000 
chance that an event will occur, what is the percentage (0-100%) of 
probability the event will occur?) and 1 out of 1,000,000 times (If there 
is a 1 out of 1,000,000 chance that something will occur, what is the 
percentage (0-100%) of probability the event will occur?).  The 
percentage of participants that provided the correct percentage for the 
1 out of 1,000 probability was 65.8% (313 of 476 participants).  
Participant answers ranged from 500% to 0.001% (correct answer 
0.1%).  The percentage of participants that provided the correct 
percentage for the 1 out of 1,000,000 probability was 53.8% (255 of 474 
participants).  Participant answers ranged from 10,000% to 
0.0000001% (correct answer 0.0001%).  While there were no significant 
results between different DNA match strengths and fingerprint 
strengths, more participants provided the correct answer for the lower 
probability question compared with the higher probability question.  
(See Figure 5). 
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Figure 5.  Probability Percentages 
 
Figure 5.  Participants provided more correct probability percentages 
when answering the 1 out of 1,000 chance compared to the 1 out of 
1,000,000 chance. 
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whether or not participants provided the correct probability was 
examined.  There was a positive correlation between number of math 
and science courses and getting 1 out of 1,000 probability correct, r = 
0.09, N = 476, p = .044.  The more math and science courses the 
participant took, the more likely they were to provide the correct 
probability.  A similar relationship was found with the 1 out of 
1,000,000 probability, r = 0.14, N = 474, p = .002.   
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Chapter 5 – Discussion 
 The results were inconsistent with the initial predictions.  The 
presence of DNA evidence did not increase the mock jurors perceptions 
of the strength of the fingerprint evidence.  Mock jurors tended to 
under weigh the probabilistic fingerprint evidence, regardless of the 
level of DNA match that was presented with it.  Jurors did not rate 
probabilistic fingerprint evidence more conservatively than fingerprint 
match evidence.  The only significant difference between varying 
fingerprint strengths was found in the amount of guilty verdicts when 
no DNA match was found.  Mock jurors rendered more guilty verdicts 
as the fingerprint strength increased.   
 Mock jurors were able to differentiate between the different 
strengths of DNA matches for the majority of questions asked about 
the case (strength of case, likelihood of guilt, strength of DNA 
evidence, strength of fingerprint evidence, reliability of surveillance 
video), but there were no significant differences between the 
fingerprint strengths.  Fingerprint “matches” were rated the same as 
the different strengths of probabilistic fingerprint evidence.  The 
results show that participants have problems understanding 
fingerprint testimony when provided in probabilistic form.  For some of 
the case dependent measures, participants provided similar ratings 
between the lower and higher strength DNA matches (these items 
	  	   46	  
were marginally significant).  This is important to report, because past 
studies have reported that participants were able to readily 
differentiate between these different DNA match levels (Koehler, 2001; 
Koehler, 2000).  It is possible that the presence of other important 
evidence (in this case, fingerprint evidence) blurred the lines between 
these DNA match strengths.  Past studies have concentrated on one 
certain type of evidence and did not include other types of evidence 
important to the case (Koehler, 2001).  This study concentrated on two 
major types of evidence (DNA and fingerprint) for the participants to 
provide conclusions about.   
 Notably, participants rated the likelihood that the fingerprint 
found in the mask at the crime scene was the defendant’s as higher 
when presented with higher DNA matches.  There was no significant 
difference in the fingerprint likelihood between the varying strengths 
of fingerprint evidence.  Participants were not able to differentiate 
between the varying probabilities of fingerprint evidence.  It has been 
shown through past studies that jurors have problems with 
probabilistic evidence (Koehler & Macchi, 2004; Schklar & Diamond, 
1999).  This may be due to participants misunderstanding of what a 
likelihood ratio is.  The large numbers could be confusing, especially 
when DNA evidence is presented in such small fractions.  With 
participants being able to distinguish the differences between varying 
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strengths of DNA matches, it might be helpful to provide fingerprint 
evidence in multiple ways to provide the most accuracy (Koehler, 
2001).   
 With regards to general questions, participants rated the 
general accuracy of DNA and fingerprint examinations to be higher 
when presented with higher DNA matches.  Also, participants had 
fewer reservations about science when presented with higher DNA 
matches.  Again, no significant results were found between the varying 
strengths of fingerprint evidence.  Similar results have been found in 
previous studies (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Shelton, 2008).  Jurors have 
expectations to be provided with strong scientific evidence.  They tend 
to rate evidence as more accurate when presented with stronger 
scientific evidence.  Also when people have fewer reservations about 
science, they tend to be less skeptical about scientific evidence in court.   
 Another interesting find concerned the verdict.  When no DNA 
was present, participants were able to differentiate between the 
varying strengths of fingerprint evidence.  Participants rendered more 
guilty verdicts as the strength of the fingerprint evidence increased.  
Participants were also wary of the fingerprint “match”.  They rendered 
a guilty verdict when provided with a fingerprint “match” at a higher 
percentage than the lowest probabilistic fingerprint evidence, but a 
lower percentage than the moderate probabilistic fingerprint evidence.  
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This indicates that participants did properly weigh the fingerprint 
“match” evidence.  However, once DNA match evidence was 
introduced, participants were no longer able to differentiate between 
the fingerprint strengths.  The mere presence of a DNA match, 
whether high or low, affected the verdict.  When presented with the 
highest DNA match and the highest strength fingerprint evidence, 
participants rendered less guilty verdicts.  These results are similar to 
those found in other studies (Koehler, 2011a).  Jurors can be 
apprehensive about rendering a guilty verdict even when presented 
with strong matching evidence.   
These results display the difficulties jurors could have when 
faced with many different types of evidence.  It seems to become 
complicated for jurors to weigh all the evidence properly, which may 
cause them to be apprehensive about providing a guilty verdict.  Also, 
it has been found that participants are affected by error rates (Koehler, 
2011a).  Since error rates were not explicitly stated in this study, it 
could have caused slight confusion about rating the different types of 
evidence.  It could also be possible that participants in this study were 
not provided with enough additional context about the evidence, so 
they did not feel comfortable convicting the defendant.  There was no 
voir dire in this case.  The participants were not provided with opening 
and closing statements, live witnesses, instructions, objections, or 
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deliberations with other jurors that would be present in a normal 
courtroom setting.  Without these contextual clues, participants may 
not have been completely convinced the evidence in front of them was 
linked to the defendant enough to be certain of guilt.  This also 
highlights the limitations of an online study comparative to a live 
study that can provide all of these contextual clues.   
 Some reasons as to why participants made certain decisions was 
explored.  It was found that as age increased, reservations about 
science decreased.  Also, as college level increased, reservations about 
science decreased.  With age, people seem to understand and become 
more comfortable with science.  Also, as people become more educated 
they become more comfortable with science.  These results may not 
generalize as well to the overall population that could serve on a jury.  
The participants in this study were from a concentrated age group.  
Also, they were all enrolled in college level courses, which means they 
have an overall higher education status than the general population.  
These results can still be useful to display that with more knowledge 
comes stronger understandings about science.  Something could be 
implemented in the court system to educate jurors about different 
practices in science to make them more comfortable with the scientific 
information they could be presented with in the courtroom.  This could 
be implemented by providing a short overview of different forensic 
	  	   50	  
processes that would be seen during the trial.  Also, something as 
simple as a pamphlet explaining the different processes could help a 
juror more readily follow along with the scientific testimony.   
In regards to the “CSI effect”, this study found that people who 
watched more forensic and crime themed shows found themselves to 
better understand the process that forensic scientists use to analyze 
and compare DNA evidence, fingerprint evidence, and other types of 
forensic evidence.  Similar results have been found in previous studies 
(Schweitzer & Saks, 2007; Shelton, 2008).  Jurors who watch more 
crime shows may be overconfident about their understanding of 
forensic processes, which could in turn produce an overconfidence in 
their understanding of trial information and verdicts; however, in this 
study, there was no significant relationship found between the hours of 
forensic and crime themed shows watched and verdict confidence.  
Participants who watched more crime shows felt they had a better 
understanding of the forensic process, but this did not lead to greater 
confidence in their processing of the evidence at hand to provide a 
verdict. 
This could provide evidence that the “CSI effect” is more of a 
belief than actual problem (Podlas, 2006).  People often rely on 
television to provide education because they have little to no personal 
experience with the legal system.  This could be attributed to a “tech 
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effect” more so than the “CSI effect” (Shelton, 2008, p. 375).  This 
theory explains that people have stronger understandings of forensic 
processes due to the changes in culture and the advancements made in 
technological and informational distribution.  Information is readily 
available on television, computers, phones, and other electronic media.  
People are only a few seconds away from information.  Although all the 
information may cause a greater confidence, no evidence has been 
found that it provides overconfidence.  So, while participants did 
believe themselves to have a better understanding of forensic 
processes, there was no further evidence to show that it affected any 
aspects of the case at hand.   
In regards to difficulties in understanding statistics, an 
alarming number of participants were unable to provide correct 
probability percentages for a 1 out of 1,000 chance or a 1 out of 
1,000,000 chance.  It has been shown in the past that many people of 
varying intelligence levels are often confused by probabilities and other 
elementary statistical procedures (Koehler, 2011b).  Although many 
participants did not seem to understand how to compute probabilities, 
many were still able to weigh DNA evidence properly.  It is possible 
that people may recognize extremely small numbers as being a strong 
likelihood of guilt.  This line becomes blurred with likelihood ratios, 
which are much larger numbers.  It seems that some participants 
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became confused with the probabilities and provided numbers much 
larger than one hundred.  Participants may be confusing likelihood 
ratios and probability percentages, or thinking of them as the same 
thing.  To correct this issue, it may be useful to provide court prepared 
instructions of the differences between likelihood ratios and probability 
percentages and how to mathematically calculate them.  It has been 
shown when provided with court prepared notes, participants had 
higher scores on objective measures of facts in the law when compared 
with participants who just took notes themselves (Kelly, 2010).  
Mandated court prepared notes could be extremely useful to future 
trials.   
Future Research – Future research investigating DNA evidence 
and its impact on probabilistic fingerprint evidence should include 
written notes that explain the differences between likelihood ratios 
and probability percentages.  It would be interesting to see if these 
notes would aid in a greater understanding of the probabilistic 
fingerprint evidence.  Also, it may be useful to provide more contextual 
clues surrounding the case (objections, rulings, deliberations).  
Deliberations could be the most insightful.  If participants are able to 
discuss the evidence with other participants, it could produce a 
stronger understanding of the evidence.  Also, because some are better 
at math and statistics than others, it could be useful to have someone 
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explain the evidence to a juror who does not fully understand it.  An in-
person mock trial situation would be best to examine this information 
and would be a closer approximation of actual jury procedures than the 
online case reading provided in this study.   
An additional direction would be to provide more detail about 
both the DNA and fingerprint evidence.  For example, including more 
information about the fingerprint, such as if it was full or partial and 
the clarity of the latent print, could help participants distinguish the 
differences between the strengths of the fingerprint evidence.  More 
contextual information could lead to a better understanding of the 
evidence.   
A final suggestion would be to provide other stronger types of 
evidence along with the DNA and fingerprint evidence.  An example of 
this would be if the eyewitness were able to describe the perpetrator 
and possibly identify him or her in a lineup.  In addition, there could 
be trace evidence, such as a shoe print or tire mark, that could link the 
suspect to the scene.  Multitudes of evidence are often presented 
during trials, some evidence stronger than others.  It would be 
interesting to investigate if participants are able to weigh evidence 
better when presented with more evidence, or if it would impede their 
understandings of individual pieces of evidence.    
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DNA 0.0001%, Fingerprint 10,000,000 Scenario 
 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. The mask contained 
head hairs believed to have been left behind by the perpetrator.  DNA 
was extracted from the roots of the hairs. 
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask, which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide DNA and fingerprint samples to police for comparison with 
the DNA extracted from the head hairs and the latent print recovered 
from the mask from the crime scene. DNA tests were performed using 
the DNA profile from the suspects and the profile of the DNA extracted 
from the hairs found in the mask at the crime scene.  A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from suspects and 
the latent print from the crime scene. Based on the results, one of the 
suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with murder.  
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At trial, the prosecution called upon the forensic DNA expert who 
testified “The probability that the suspect would match the DNA found 
in the hair if he were not the source is 0.0001% or 1 in 1,000,000”.   
 
The prosecution also called upon the fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed “It is 
10 million times more likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if 
the Mr. Robinson is the source of the fingerprint found at the crime 
scene than if some other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the 
source of the fingerprint”.   
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  
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DNA 0.0001%, Fingerprint 10,000 Scenario 
 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. The mask contained 
head hairs believed to have been left behind by the perpetrator.  DNA 
was extracted from the roots of the hairs. 
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask, which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide DNA and fingerprint samples to police for comparison with 
the DNA extracted from the head hairs and the latent print recovered 
from the mask from the crime scene. DNA tests were performed using 
the DNA profile from the suspects and the profile of the DNA extracted 
from the hairs found in the mask at the crime scene.  A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from suspects and 
the latent print from the crime scene. Based on the results, one of the 
suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with murder.  
 
At trial, the prosecution called upon the forensic DNA expert who 
testified “The probability that Mr. Robinson would match the DNA 
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found in the hair if he were not the source is 0.0001% or 1 in 
1,000,000”.   
 
The prosecution also called upon the fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed “It is 
10,000 times more likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if 
the Mr. Robinson is the source of the fingerprint found at the crime 
scene than if some other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the 
source of the fingerprint”.   
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  
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DNA 0.0001%, Fingerprint 100 Scenario 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. The mask contained 
head hairs believed to have been left behind by the perpetrator.  DNA 
was extracted from the roots of the hairs. 
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask, which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide DNA and fingerprint samples to police for comparison with 
the DNA extracted from the head hairs and the latent print recovered 
from the mask from the crime scene. DNA tests were performed using 
the DNA profile from the suspects and the profile of the DNA extracted 
from the hairs found in the mask at the crime scene.  A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from suspects and 
the latent print from the crime scene. Based on the results, one of the 
suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with murder.  
 
At trial, the prosecution called upon the forensic DNA expert who 
testified “The probability that Mr. Robinson would match the DNA 
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found in the hair if he were not the source is 0.0001% or 1 in 
1,000,000”.   
 
The prosecution also called upon the fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed “It is 
100 times more likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if the 
Mr. Robinson is the source of the fingerprint found at the crime scene 
than if some other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the source of 
the fingerprint”.   
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  
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DNA 0.0001%, Fingerprint Match Scenario 
 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. The mask contained 
head hairs believed to have been left behind by the perpetrator.  DNA 
was extracted from the roots of the hairs. 
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask, which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide DNA and fingerprint samples to police for comparison with 
the DNA extracted from the head hairs and the latent print recovered 
from the mask from the crime scene. DNA tests were performed using 
the DNA profile from the suspects and the profile of the DNA extracted 
from the hairs found in the mask at the crime scene.  A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from suspects and 
the latent print from the crime scene. Based on the results, one of the 
suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with murder.  
 
At trial, the prosecution called upon the forensic DNA expert who 
testified “The probability that Mr. Robinson would match the DNA 
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found in the hair if he were not the source is 0.0001% or 1 in 
1,000,000”.   
 
The prosecution also called upon the fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed, “The 
latent print found at the crime scene is a match to Mr. Robinson’s 
print”. 
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  
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DNA 0.1%, Fingerprint 10,000,000 Scenario 
 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. The mask contained 
head hairs believed to have been left behind by the perpetrator.  DNA 
was extracted from the roots of the hairs. 
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask, which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide DNA and fingerprint samples to police for comparison with 
the DNA extracted from the head hairs and the latent print recovered 
from the mask from the crime scene. DNA tests were performed using 
the DNA profile from the suspects and the profile of the DNA extracted 
from the hairs found in the mask at the crime scene.  A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from suspects and 
the latent print from the crime scene. Based on the results, one of the 
suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with murder.  
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At trial, the prosecution called upon the forensic DNA expert who 
testified “The probability that the suspect would match the DNA found 
in the hair if he were not the source is 0.1% or 1 in 1,000”.   
 
The prosecution also called upon the fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed “It is 
10 million times more likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if 
the Mr. Robinson is the source of the fingerprint found at the crime 
scene than if some other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the 
source of the fingerprint”.   
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  
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DNA 0.1%, Fingerprint 10,000 Scenario 
 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. The mask contained 
head hairs believed to have been left behind by the perpetrator.  DNA 
was extracted from the roots of the hairs. 
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask, which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide DNA and fingerprint samples to police for comparison with 
the DNA extracted from the head hairs and the latent print recovered 
from the mask from the crime scene. DNA tests were performed using 
the DNA profile from the suspects and the profile of the DNA extracted 
from the hairs found in the mask at the crime scene.  A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from suspects and 
the latent print from the crime scene. Based on the results, one of the 
suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with murder.  
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At trial, the prosecution called upon the forensic DNA expert who 
testified “The probability that Mr. Robinson would match the DNA 
found in the hair if he were not the source is 0.1% or 1 in 1,000”.   
 
The prosecution also called upon the fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed “It is 
10,000 times more likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if 
the Mr. Robinson is the source of the fingerprint found at the crime 
scene than if some other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the 
source of the fingerprint”.   
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  
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DNA 0.1%, Fingerprint 100 Scenario 
 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. The mask contained 
head hairs believed to have been left behind by the perpetrator.  DNA 
was extracted from the roots of the hairs. 
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask, which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide DNA and fingerprint samples to police for comparison with 
the DNA extracted from the head hairs and the latent print recovered 
from the mask from the crime scene. DNA tests were performed using 
the DNA profile from the suspects and the profile of the DNA extracted 
from the hairs found in the mask at the crime scene.  A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from suspects and 
the latent print from the crime scene. Based on the results, one of the 
suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with murder.  
 
	  	   74	  
At trial, the prosecution called upon the forensic DNA expert who 
testified “The probability that Mr. Robinson would match the DNA 
found in the hair if he were not the source is 0.1% or 1 in 1,000”.   
 
The prosecution also called upon the fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed “It is 
100 times more likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if the 
Mr. Robinson is the source of the fingerprint found at the crime scene 
than if some other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the source of 
the fingerprint”.   
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  
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DNA 0.1%, Fingerprint Match Scenario 
 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. The mask contained 
head hairs believed to have been left behind by the perpetrator.  DNA 
was extracted from the roots of the hairs. 
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide DNA and fingerprint samples to police for comparison with 
the DNA extracted from the head hairs and the latent print recovered 
from the mask from the crime scene. DNA tests were performed using 
the DNA profile from the suspects and the profile of the DNA extracted 
from the hairs found in the mask at the crime scene.  A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from suspects and 
the latent print from the crime scene. Based on the results, one of the 
suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with murder.  
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At trial, the prosecution called upon the forensic DNA expert who 
testified “The probability that Mr. Robinson would match the DNA 
found in the hair if he were not the source is 0.1% or 1 in 1,000”.   
 
The prosecution also called upon the fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed, “The 
latent print found at the crime scene is a match to Mr. Robinson’s 
print.” 
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  
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No DNA, Fingerprint 10,000,000 Scenario 
 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. No biological material 
was found from which DNA could be extracted. 
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask, which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide fingerprint samples to police for comparison with the latent 
print recovered from the mask from the crime scene. A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from the suspects 
and the latent print from the crime scene. Based on these results, one 
of the suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with 
murder.  
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At trial, the prosecution called upon a fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed “It is 
10 million times more likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if 
Mr. Robinson is the source of the fingerprint found at the crime scene 
than if some other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the source of 
the fingerprint”. 
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  
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No DNA, Fingerprint 10,000 Scenario 
 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. No biological material 
was found from which DNA could be extracted. 
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask, which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide fingerprint samples to police for comparison with the latent 
print recovered from the mask from the crime scene. A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from the suspects 
and the latent print from the crime scene. Based on these results, one 
of the suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with 
murder.  
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At trial, the prosecution called upon a fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed “It is 
10,000 times more likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if 
Mr. Robinson is the source of the fingerprint found at the crime scene 
than if some other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the source of 
the fingerprint”. 
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  
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No DNA, Fingerprint 100 Scenario 
 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. No biological material 
was found from which DNA could be extracted. 
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask, which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide fingerprint samples to police for comparison with the latent 
print recovered from the mask from the crime scene. A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from the suspects 
and the latent print from the crime scene. Based on these results, one 
of the suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with 
murder.  
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At trial, the prosecution called upon a fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed “It is 
100 times more likely to observe this configuration of minutiae if Mr. 
Robinson is the source of the fingerprint found at the crime scene than 
if some other, randomly selected, unrelated person is the source of the 
fingerprint”. 
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  
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No DNA, Fingerprint Match Scenario 
 
State v. Robinson 
This matter concerns the case of State v. Aaron Robinson. Mr. 
Robinson has been accused of murdering Charles Greene during an 
attempted robbery of a convenience store. 
 
According to a reliable eyewitness account, the perpetrator, wearing a 
mask to cover his face, entered the convenience store at approximately 
10:20 pm on October 12, a year ago, pulled out a gun, and demanded 
the money from the register. The clerk resisted and a struggle ensued, 
during which the store clerk pulled off the perpetrator’s mask. The 
perpetrator then shot and killed the clerk, Mr. Greene.  The 
surveillance video from the convenience store was not functioning at 
the time of the robbery. The eyewitness was able to give the police a 
thorough account of what happened, but had not seen the perpetrator’s 
face. The mask worn by the perpetrator was recovered from the store 
and sent to the crime laboratory for analysis. 
The mask recovered from the crime scene was examined for traces of 
biological material belonging to the perpetrator. No biological material 
was found from which DNA could be extracted.   
 
The mask was also examined for traces of other forensic evidence. A 
latent print was lifted from the mask, which was believed to belong to 
the perpetrator. 
 
During routine interviews of people who live in the neighborhood, the 
police identified several potential suspects. All of the suspects agreed 
to provide fingerprint samples to police for comparison with the latent 
print recovered from the mask from the crime scene. A fingerprint 
examiner compared the fingerprint samples taken from the suspects 
and the latent print from the crime scene.  Based on these results, one 
of the suspects, Aaron Robinson, was arrested and charged with 
murder.  
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At trial, the prosecution called upon a fingerprint examiner who 
testified that the results of the fingerprint comparison revealed, “The 
latent print found at the crime scene is a match to Mr. Robinson’s 
print.”   
 
The defense argued that the fingerprint evidence has little meaning 
because it is merely circumstantial. The defense also argued that other 
forms of direct evidence were missing (such as a lineup identification, 
or the murder weapon) that would link Mr. Robinson to the crime.  	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APPENDIX	  B	  	  DEPENDENT	  MEASURES	  QUESTIONNAIRE	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Please respond to the following questions by thinking about the 
information presented in the trial synopsis you just read. Keep in mind 
that you should imagine yourself to be a juror deciding the merits of this 
case, even though you have limited information on which to base your 
decision. 
 
1. How strong do you think the case is against Aaron 
Robinson (the defendant)? 
 
1 - Weak Case   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 – Very 
Strong 
 
2. Based on the information you read, what is the likelihood 
the defendant is guilty of murdering the convenience store 
clerk? 
 
1 - Not Guilty 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Strong 
Likelihood of Guilt 
 
3. How strong do you think the DNA evidence is against the 
defendant? 
1 - Weak 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 - Strong DNA 
Evidence  0 – N/A 
 
4. Assume the defendant was found guilty. What type of 
sentence would you advocate for him? 
 
Light Sentence (1-5 years)  
Moderate Sentence (6-15 years) 
Long Sentence (16-25 years)  
Life Sentence 
Death Penalty 
 
5. How certain are you that the police have apprehended the 
correct suspect in this case? 
 
1- Uncertain 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Extremely 
Certain 
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6. What do you think is the likelihood that the head hairs 
found in the mask at the crime scene belong to the 
defendant? 
 
1- Hairs are not his 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – 
Strong Likelihood 
 
7. What do you think is the likelihood that the fingerprint 
found in the mask at the crime scene was left by the 
defendant? 
 
1-Not his Fingerprint 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – 
Strong Likelihood  
 
8. Rank the evidence in order of importance in determining 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant: 
 
DDNA  1 2 3 
Fingerprint 1 2 3 
Eyewitness 1 2 3 
 
9. Do you think the defendant is guilty or not guilty of 
committing murder? 
 
Guilty 
Not Guilty 
 
10. How much confidence do you have in the verdict you 
chose? 
 
1 – No Confidence 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – 
Strong Confidence 
 
11.  In general, how accurate do you think are the results of 
fingerprint comparisons? 
 
1 – Not Accurate  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – 
Very Accurate 
 
12.  How accurate do you think was the eyewitness’s account 
of the crime? 
 
1 – Not Accurate  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – 
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Very Accurate 
 
13. In general, how accurate do you think are the results of 
DNA analyses? 
 
1 – Not Accurate  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – 
Very Accurate 
 
14. How accurately do you feel DNA evidence is presented in 
trials? 
 
1 – Not Accurate  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – 
Very Accurate 
 
 15. How reliable do you think the surveillance video is in 
identifying the defendant? 
 
1 – Not Reliable  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – 
Very Reliable 
 
16. Do you have general reservations about science? 
 
1-No Reservations 2 3 4  5-Some Reservations  6 7
 8 9  10-Strong Reservations  
 
17. Approximately how many college level science and math 
courses have you taken? 
 
State Number of courses 
 
18. Are fingerprints infallible evidence? 
 
Yes 
No 
Not Sure 
 
19. How well do you feel you understand the process of 
analyzing and comparing fingerprint evidence? 
 
 
1 – No Understanding 2 3 4 5 – Moderate Understanding
 6 7 8 9 10 – Strong Understanding 
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20. Is any degree (low to high probability matches) of DNA 
evidence enough to convict? 
 
Yes 
No 
Not Sure 
 
21. How well do you feel you understand the process of 
analyzing and comparing DNA evidence? 
 
1 – No Understanding 2 3 4 5 – Moderate Understanding
 6 7 8 9 10 – Strong Understanding 
 
22. How accurately do you feel fingerprint evidence is 
presented in trials? 
 
1 – Not Accurate  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Very 
Accurate 
 
23. Is DNA infallible evidence (always correct when a DNA 
match is made between defendant and crime scene)? 
 
Yes 
No 
Not Sure 
N/A 
 
24. If there is a 1 out of 1,000 chance that an event will 
occur, what is the percentage (0- 100%) of probability the 
event will occur? 
 
State Probability 
 
25. How many hours do you spend per week watching forensic 
themed shows (i.e. CSI, CSI Miami, CSI New York)?  
 
State Hours 
 
26. How many hours do you spend per week watching general 
crime-themed programs (i.e. Law and Order SVU, Law and 
Order LA, NCIS)?  
 
State Hours 
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27. In general, do you feel there are major deficiencies in the 
way forensic evidence is collected? 
 
1 – No Deficiencies 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Major 
Deficiencies 
 
28. How strongly do you understand the processes that 
forensic scientists use to analyze different types of evidence? 
1 – Do Not Understand 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – 
Strongly Understand 
 
29. Do you consider fingerprint examinations to be more 
subjective (the conclusion given by the examiner is based on 
his own interpretation/opinion based on his experience 
conducting forensic analyses) or objective (the conclusion 
given by the examiner is based on scientific data)? 
 
More Subjective 
More Objective 
 
30. Is any degree (low to high level matches) of fingerprint 
evidence enough to convict? 
 
Yes 
No 
Not Sure 
 
31. If there is a 1 out of 1,000,000 chance that something will 
occur, what is the percentage (0-100%) of probability the 
event will occur? 
 
State Probability 
 
32. Write a description about how you think forensic 
fingerprint experts examine fingerprint evidence. 
 
Write Description 
 
33. Write a description about how you think forensic DNA 
experts examine DNA evidence. 
 
Write Description 
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Biographical Questionnaire Please take a moment to respond to the 
following questions. 
 
34. Today's Date: 
 
State Date 
 
35. Age: 
 
State Age 
 
36. Sex: 
 
Male 
Female 
 
37. What ethnicity do you consider yourself? 
 
State Ethnicity 
 
38.  Year in school: 
 
Freshman  
Sophomore  
Junior  
Senior  
Graduate Student 	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APPENDIX C 
 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB) APPROVAL LETTER 	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To: Dawn Mcquiston-Surrett
FAB
From: Mark Roosa, Chair
Soc Beh IRB
Date: 11/10/2008
Committee Action: Exemption Granted
IRB Action Date: 11/10/2008
IRB Protocol #: 0811003445
Study Title: Assessing the Persuasiveness of DNA Evidence in the Courtroom
The above-referenced protocol is considered exempt after review by the Institutional Review Board pursuant to
Federal regulations, 45 CFR Part 46.101(b)(2) .
This part of the federal regulations requires that the information be recorded by investigators in such a manner that
subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects. It is necessary that the information
obtained not be such that if disclosed outside the research, it could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or
civil liability, or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.
You should retain a copy of this letter for your records.
